Pancasila, Religion, and Democracy in Yudian and Huntington’s Perspectives

Abstract

General Background: Religion and democracy are two pivotal forces shaping social and political systems worldwide. Specific Background: In Indonesia, the relationship between religion and democracy is further complicated by the centrality of Pancasila as the state ideology, necessitating a nuanced understanding of its interaction with religious values. Knowledge Gap: While numerous studies have addressed religion’s role in politics, few have conducted a comparative analysis between local Islamic scholars and Western political theorists in the context of Pancasila and global dynamics. Aims: This study aims to analyze the perspectives of Yudian Wahyudi and Samuel P. Huntington on the intersection of religion and democracy, highlighting their similarities, differences, and contemporary relevance. Results: Findings show that Yudian conceptualizes religion as an integrative moral foundation that harmonizes with Pancasila through integrative tauhid and maqasid al-shari‘ah, while Huntington emphasizes religion’s ambivalence, viewing it as both a driver of democratization and a source of civilizational conflict. Novelty: The study contributes a comparative framework that bridges Indonesian Islamic thought with global political theories, enriching discourse on democracy and religion. Implications: These insights underscore the importance of prudent management of religion in politics to foster inclusive and sustainable democratic governance in plural societies

Highlights:

• Comparative analysis of local and global perspectives.

• Religion as both moral foundation and conflict source.

• Implications for inclusive democratic governance.

Keywords: Pancasila, Religion, Democracy, Yudian Wahyudi, Huntington

Introduction

Religion is a system of belief encompassing values, institutions, and norms that serve as a foundation for action and behavior in order to create a dynamic society[1]. Etymologically, the term democracy is defined as government by the people (demos meaning people; kratos meaning government). However, in its historical development, democracy has been understood in two specific forms. First, “Direct Democracy,” a form of government in which the rights of every citizen to make political decisions are exercised directly through majority-rule procedures. Second, “Representative Democracy,” a form of government in which citizens are granted equal rights to channel their aspirations through the House of Representatives (DPR)[2]. The conceptualization of religion and democracy thus reveals a common point in the context of human beings as social creatures and the pursuit of harmonious life within society. Therefore, the relationship between religion and democracy may generate at least two possible outcomes: religion can either promote progress or hinder the development of a democratic system, depending on how religious adherents integrate their beliefs as guiding principles in their social conduct and actions.

This article examines the relationship between religion and democracy through the perspectives of Yudian Wahyudi and Samuel P. Huntington. According to Yudian, a prominent Muslim scholar, the harmony between religion and democracy represents the contextualization of Pancasila’s values. In contrast, Huntington, as a Western political scientist, offers profound insights into the interaction between religion and democracy, particularly through his works such as The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century and The Clash of Civilizations, where he explores the role of religion in global political dynamics, including democratic transitions. This serves as the background for the author to write the article entitled “PANCASILA AND THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS: An Analytical Study on the Relationship between Religion and Democracy in the Perspectives of Yudian and Huntington.” The purpose of this research is to explore the similarities and differences in the thoughts of both figures, as well as their relevance in the modern context.

Methods

The study employs a qualitative methodology with a library research and historical approach. The findings conclude that despite their differing viewpoints, both offer significant insights for understanding the challenges and opportunities within the relationship between religion and democracy [3].

Results and Discussion

A. The Relationship Between Religion and Democracy As a Form of Contextualization of Pancasila Values in Yudian’s Perspective

1. Biography of Yudian and Huntington

Yudian Wahyudi is a Muslim scholar who holds the titles Prof. K.H. Drs. Yudian Wahyudi, M.A., Ph.D., and was born in Balikpapan, East Kalimantan, on April 17, 1960. He came from a nationalist family background; his father was a revolutionary soldier from Banyumas, Central Java, who was stationed in Balikpapan. His intellectual journey began at the educational institution Madrasah Darut Ta’lim in Kampung Damai, Balikpapan. He later continued his studies at an Islamic boarding school in Tremas, Pacitan, where he completed the equivalent of junior high school. A year before pursuing his undergraduate studies at IAIN Sunan Kalijaga, Yogyakarta, he also studied for a period at the Krapyak Islamic boarding school, also located in Yogyakarta.

Yudian obtained his undergraduate degree (B.A.) in the Faculty of Sharia. He then continued his studies at the master’s level in the same faculty. Not fully satisfied with his expertise in Sharia, he pursued further studies at the Faculty of Philosophy, Gadjah Mada University (UGM). Believing that his academic journey in Indonesia was still insufficient, Yudian continued his education at McGill University, Canada. After completing his highest level of education, he advanced his career and achieved numerous accomplishments. Among his notable achievements in Indonesia was his appointment as Head of the BPIP (Pancasila Ideology Development Agency) by President Joko Widodo in 2020. On the international stage, he successfully served as President of the Asian Islamic Universities Association (AIUA) for two consecutive terms (2017–2021)[4].

Meanwhile, Samuel Phillips Huntington was an American political scientist who served as a Professor and Chair of the Department of Government at Harvard University, as well as Chair of the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs. Huntington also worked as a researcher focusing on issues of American national identity and its implications for the international arena. In addition, he taught courses on comparative politics and global politics in the post–Cold War era[5].

Among his works are the book Political Order in Changing Societies (1968), the journal article Foreign Affairs (1993), the book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, the journal article Religion in The Third Wave, the book Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress (2000), and his final book Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity (2004)[6].

Based on the life background of these two figures, there is no doubt about their expertise in the fields of politics and social sciences, as reflected in their achievements and scholarly networks. Their thoughts and ideas expressed in the public sphere, particularly regarding the values of Pancasila and human civilization within the realm of politics, are at the very least grounded in the knowledge and experiences they possess.

2. The Concept of Religion in Politics

According to the perspective of Nurcholish Madjid, often referred to as Cak Nur,

throughout his career as a prominent figure introducing ideas of secularization and pluralism, he emphasized that religion and politics share the same ultimate goal, namely to ensure the future of the nation and the betterment of human life. However, this commonality of purpose does not render politics sacred in the same way as religion. In its relation to politics, religion should serve as a partner in upholding humanitarian values through political policies, while setting aside religious fanaticism, even though religion retains its own authority within the process[7].

The relationship between religion and politics is also highlighted by Yudian in his perspective on Islam and Pancasila, where he grounds his thought on the harmony between Islam and Pancasila by integrating Islamic theological principles into natural law and human law, which he refers to as “integrative tauhid.” He further proposes maqasid al-shari‘ah as the foundation for understanding Islam as a processual entity—an ongoing process that continuously adapts to the development of time, place, and context. In other words, Islam is a process rather than a final goal, one that leads to safety or security in the theological (divinity), cosmic (natural law), and humanistic (human law) dimensions. The unification of these three elements, according to Yudian, constitutes the essence of tauhid: in the theological realm, it is manifested in the ayat Qur’aniyah (the textual signs of Allah); in the cosmic realm, it is reflected in the ayat kauniyah (the natural signs of Allah); and in the humanistic realm, it is embodied in the ayat insaniyah (the socio-historical signs of Allah). This, Yudian explains, is what is meant by the “integrity of tauhid,” or the unification of the threefold signs of God[4].

In his book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Huntington also emphasizes the significant role of religion in future conflicts between civilizations. It serves as a reminder that religion can play a dual role: it may foster peace through its spiritual aspects, but conversely, it can also generate conflict and strife when interpreted in line with the unilateral interests of its adherents (religious fanaticism). Such fanaticism may even lead to wars waged in the name of God and the Holy Scriptures. These conflicts, according to Huntington, are likely to occur along the dividing lines between religions and cultures[5].

Based on the above statement, it can be concluded that the interaction between religion and politics may generate the following impacts:

a) Its relation to social stability. When religious values are integrated into political policies, they can create social stability by establishing shared social norms that are upheld through political governance.

b) Its relation to social conflict. When religion is used as a tool for the political interests of certain religious groups, it can generate tension and conflict among different segments of society. This occurs due to cultural differences between one group and another.

Huntington also identifies several causes that may lead to future wars between civilizations, which he outlines in at least six points. First, differences between civilizations are rooted in history, language, culture or tradition, and religion. These differences can produce diverse perspectives on vertical relationships between humans and God, humans as social beings, rights and obligations, authority, equality, and social stratification. Thus far, such differences have generated the most intense and enduring conflicts. However, differences do not always necessarily result in conflict. Second, the world is becoming increasingly interconnected, meaning that interactions among people of different civilizations are rising. This growing contact heightens awareness of civilizational histories, which in turn fosters opportunities to recognize differences among civilizations, but paradoxically can also reinforce hostility toward other civilizations. Third, global economic and social modernization has led individuals and groups to lose their local identities as sources of national and cultural belonging.

Fourth, the growing awareness of civilizations is made possible by the dual role of the West. For instance, in the context of “democracy advocacy and political intervention,” Western countries often promote the values of democracy, human rights, and freedom, yet on the other hand, they are also involved in political interventions in other nations, either directly (through war or invasion) or indirectly (by supporting authoritarian regimes that serve their interests). In another context, such as “economic hegemony,” the West frequently provides economic aid to developing countries with certain conditions (such as privatization or economic reform), which in some cases weakens the economic independence of the recipient states. Fifth, cultural characteristics and differences are more difficult to unify or reconcile compared to political and economic differences. For example, in the political sphere, a citizen may hold dual nationality, being half French and half Arab, but in terms of religious culture, it is far more difficult for someone to be half Catholic and half Muslim. Sixth, economic regionalism is increasingly on the rise[8]. This refers to the emergence of a new regionalism approach that critiques the old one, which overly glorified the state as the main actor. This approach appeared in Western Europe after the end of World War II. However, with the rise of new regionalism, the existence of national identity—once held in high regard—gradually diminishes, swept away by the currents of globalization, where states are compelled to conform to the shared goals of the majority of nations[9].

3. Pancasila in the Study of Yudian Wahyudi

Yudian, in introducing his ideas on Pancasila, builds his foundation on the assertion that Islam, as part of the plurality of monotheistic religions, is not in conflict with the values of Pancasila. He argues that Pancasila, as the state ideology and foundation, serves as a meeting point among religions, particularly in Indonesia. He further explains that the concept underlying Islamic thought is embodied in the principle of maqasid al-shari’ah, which contains universal values that other religions can also embrace. Moreover, according to Yudian, Pancasila represents the “locality of Islamic shari’ah,” meaning that the values enshrined in its five principles are manifestations of the maqasid al-shari’ah with universal qualities as the ideology of the Indonesian nation (philosophische grondslag). In addition, the concept of “tauhid integration” that he promotes also underpins the creation of Pancasila’s values[10].

The first foundation is Yudian’s understanding of Islam and his concept of “integrative tauhid,” which serves as the basis of his thought on the harmony between Islam and Pancasila. According to him, Islam and tauhid can be understood through three aspects[4].

a) Islam is a journey toward salvation and peace. The religion does not merely signify an attitude of submission or surrender. If Islam were understood solely as submission, then a Muslim would make no effort to attain that salvation and peace. Such peace and salvation encompass both life in this world and in the hereafter.

b) Yudian distinguishes the meaning of Islam into two categories. First, islam with a lowercase “i,” which refers to universal salvation and peace. In this sense, anyone, regardless of their religion, can attain islam as long as they adhere to the ayat kauniyah (signs of nature) and ayat insaniyah (signs of humanity). Second, Islam with a capital “I,” which denotes salvation in the context of the Islamic faith. This form of salvation can be attained by Muslims who obey the three types of God’s signs: the ayat Qur’aniyah (verses in the Qur’an), ayat kauniyah, and ayat insaniyah.

c) To attain Islam, effort in practicing tauhid is required. According to Yudian, tauhid does not only mean affirming the oneness of Allah theologically, but also connecting theological tauhid with obedience to the natural and humanistic signs.

For a Muslim who aspires to be kaffah (whole and complete), it is not sufficient to practice tauhid solely through the ayat Qur’aniyah; one must also obey God’s laws as reflected in natural and human life. In this view, natural law and human law are not always derived from the ayat Qur’aniyah, which means that non-Muslims can also observe these laws. When non-Muslims comply with natural and human laws, they are considered “muslim” in a general sense, meaning they too can attain salvation and peace in worldly life.

The second foundation of Yudian’s perspective on the harmony between Islam and Pancasila lies in maqasid al-shari‘ah (the objectives of Islamic law). Yudian highlights maqasid al-shari‘ah as a doctrine aimed at achieving, preserving, and maintaining the well-being of humanity, particularly for Muslims. To realize this, he establishes three levels of priority in formulating and implementing Islamic law, which are distinct yet complementary: al-daruriyat (fundamental necessities), al-hajiyyat (supporting needs), and al-tahsiniyyat (supplementary needs)[4].

Maqasid al-daruriyat refers to the primary objectives of Islamic law, which are

considered essential needs that must be preserved. Their absence may lead to the complete collapse of human life. These objectives constitute the most fundamental aspects of human existence, encompassing the protection of religion, life, intellect, wealth, and lineage. This view is the most commonly accepted, although the order in which these elements are mentioned may vary.[11]

Maqasid al-tahsiniyyat refers to tertiary objectives that are neither obligatory nor urgent but serve to beautify (in line with the literal meaning of tahsiniyyat, which is ornamental) the process of fulfilling daruriyyat and hajiyyat. The absence of tahsiniyyat does not disrupt or complicate life, but it may diminish aspects of aesthetics and comfort. This final priority provides a space of exploration for artists, where individual choices are highly valued. Nevertheless, it remains relative and contextual, as long as it does not conflict with the provisions established by the nass (scriptural texts).[12]

Maqasid al-hajiyyat refers to secondary objectives that function to facilitate human beings in fulfilling the needs categorized under daruriyyat. In addition, this category aims to remove obstacles that may hinder the attainment of primary objectives. Since its role is to support and complement the main goals, the existence of hajiyyat is considered important (as reflected in the literal meaning of hajiyyat), though not as crucial as daruriyyat. In other words, if these secondary objectives are not fulfilled, life will not collapse, but it may become deficient, imperfect, or even burdensome.[13]

Thus, it can be concluded that in Yudian’s thought, the relationship between Islam and Pancasila is understood as the connection between the source of values (Islam) and operational values (Pancasila). Islam is regarded as the highest source of values, rooted in tawhid. From tawhid emerges Islamic law (shari‘ah), which encompasses its ultimate objectives (maqasid al-shari‘ah). According to Yudian, tawhid is the process of affirming the oneness of God through three types of His verses: Qur’anic verses (ayat Quraniyah), cosmic verses (ayat Kauniyah), and human verses (ayat Insaniyah).

The integration of these three categories of verses, within the framework of tawhid, is reflected in Pancasila. The principles of “Just and Civilized Humanity” and “Social Justice for All the People of Indonesia” represent the ayat Insaniyah. Meanwhile, the principles of “The Unity of Indonesia” and “Democracy Guided by the Inner Wisdom of Deliberations among Representatives” reflect the ayat Kauniyah in the context of national and state life. Ultimately, these four principles are united under “Belief in the One and Only God,” which represents the ayat Quraniyah[4].

Similarly, the same applies to maqasid al-shari‘ah. The three levels of priority in Islamic law are implemented in Pancasila. The maqasid dlaruriyat are reflected in all principles of Pancasila: “Belief in the One and Only God” (hifdz al-din), “Just and Civilized Humanity” (hifdz al-nafs), “The Unity of Indonesia” (hifdz al-nasl), “Democracy Guided by the Inner Wisdom of Deliberations among Representatives” (hifdz al-‘aql), and “Social Justice for All the People of Indonesia” (hifdz al-mal). To realize these maqasid dlaruriyat, the role of maqasid hajiyyat is required, namely a national life that is united and democratic. Meanwhile, Pancasila itself—whether in terms of its name, concept, or symbol—represents the dimension of maqasid tahsiniyyat, which is ornamental in nature and reflects the local identity of the Indonesian nation. Thus, Pancasila becomes the local practice of the Indonesian people in actualizing maqasid al-shari‘ah within the life of the nation and the state. Based on this, Yudian’s idea regarding the relationship between Islam and Pancasila can be understood through the following diagram:

B. The Relationship Between Religion and Democracy in Huntington’s Case Study of The Waves of Transition

1. Democracy in The Study of Samuel P. Huntington

Towards the end of the 20th century, an increasing number of countries established democratic institutions. These institutions emerged in waves of democratization, defined as a series of transitions from non-democratic regimes to democratic ones that occurred within a certain period and in numbers exceeding the reverse transitions back to authoritarian systems[5]. In modern times, there have been three waves of democratization. Furthermore, Huntington emphasized that the flow of democratization is not always linear; at times it advances (waves of democratization), and at other times it regresses (reverse waves).

a ) First Wave (1828–1926)

The first wave of modern democratization occurred in the 20th century, beginning and marked by the American and French Revolutions, which had in fact taken place in the 19th century and involved Western countries. The American Revolution, which specifically occurred in 1828, was established as the first model of modern democratization, with a system of government that prioritized popular sovereignty while abandoning the system of absolute authority (monarchy). Over the course of more than 100 years, 30 countries followed in America’s footsteps toward democratization. Among these nations were Switzerland, France, Great Britain, several smaller European countries, Italy, Argentina, Ireland, Iceland, and others. Spain and Chile also became democratic nations in the early 1930s, after the end of the first wave[5].

b) First Reverse Wave (1922–1944)

The shift from democracy to authoritarian systems of government (the reverse wave) predominantly occurred during the 1920s to 1930s in most countries that had adopted democratic forms either before or after World War I. Greece became the only country among those that had introduced democracy before 1910 to experience a reverse wave after 1920. Only four countries that had adopted democratic systems managed to survive until around 1935. Specifically, the first reverse wave began in 1922, marked by the rise of Benito Mussolini’s regime in Italy in 1922 and Adolf Hitler’s regime in Germany in 1933[5].

c ) Second Wave (1943–1962)

The second wave of democratization began during World War II. The victory of the Allies encouraged the establishment of democratic institutions in West Germany, Italy, Austria, Japan, and Korea. On the other hand, pressure from the Soviet Union suppressed the newly emerging democracies in Czechoslovakia and Ireland. Turkey and Greece began to implement democratic systems in the late 1940s and early 1950s. In addition, several other countries also adopted democracy, though not always in a stable form, such as in Latin America (Uruguay, Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela), Pakistan (with a fragile democracy that was abolished in 1958), Malaysia, Indonesia (with a confusing parliamentary democracy from 1950 to 1957), several newly established states such as India, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and Israel (where democracy lasted for a decade or more), as well as the largest state in Africa, Nigeria[5].

d) The Second Reverse Wave

The second reverse wave began in the late 1950s when political developments and regime transitions occurred under highly authoritarian conditions. The shift toward authoritarianism started when the military intervened in the election results in Peru in 1962. Military coups also took place in Brazil and Bolivia (1964), Argentina (1966), Ecuador (1972), as well as in Uruguay and Chile. According to one theory, these countries came to be described as representing a new political system known as Bureaucratic Authoritarianism[5].

In Asia, authoritarian systems also emerged, as seen in Taiwan where the KMT (Kuomintang) regime tolerated opposition in 1950, and in military coups in Pakistan (1958) and Korea (1961). This initially “semi-authoritarian” system became more widely accepted by 1963 and evolved into a fully authoritarian regime by 1973. Other instances of authoritarian consolidation through military coups occurred in the Philippines (1972) under President Ferdinand Marcos and in India under Indira Gandhi (1973). In Indonesia, the parliamentary democracy system was replaced by Sukarno’s Guided Democracy in 1957. Several newly independent African states also succumbed to military coups, such as Nigeria in 1966, while 33 other African countries that gained independence between 1956 and 1970 adopted authoritarian regimes. This wave of postcolonial authoritarianism in Africa led to the largest proliferation of independent authoritarian systems in history, raising pessimism about the prospects of democracy in developing countries and generating concerns regarding the sustainability and effectiveness of democratic systems even in advanced nations where democracy had existed for centuries[5].

e ) The Third Wave (1974–1990)

The third wave of democracy began fifteen years after the end of Portugal’s dictatorship in 1974. Approximately 30 countries in Europe, Asia, and Latin America experienced transitions from authoritarian regimes to democratic systems. The existence of democratic movements began to gain legitimacy from other nations. Three months after the Portuguese coup, the military regime that had governed Greece since 1967 collapsed, and the government came under the leadership of Konstantinos Karamanlis, abandoning the monarchy system. From 1977 through the 1980s, the military gradually withdrew from politics, opening the way for a new political model through elections that produced civilian governments.

Approximately three-quarters of the countries that transitioned to democratic systems between 1974 and 1989 were predominantly Catholic. In this third wave, Huntington noted that religion played a significant role in either accelerating or slowing down democratic transitions. He highlighted religion as one of the cultural factors influencing the success or failure of democratic transitions. The patterns of political transitions in waves of democratization and reverse waves demonstrate two steps forward and one step back. The data on countries classified as democratic or non-democratic in Huntington’s study can be organized in the following table:

2. The Role of Religion in the Transition to Democracy

a ) Religion as a Force of Mass Mobilization and Political Identity

Modern democracy first developed and expanded most rapidly in countries where the majority of the population adhered to Christianity. Catholicism and Protestantism represented the dominant religious groups in 39 democratic countries, while Islam, Buddhism, and Confucianism were still rarely found in nations with democratic systems. Resistance against authoritarian states was largely led by religious leaders from Catholic and Protestant traditions. From this perspective, it can be hypothesized that the spread of Christianity also influenced and encouraged the development of democracy in many countries worldwide. Between the 1960s and 1980s, Christianity experienced significant growth in South Korea, which previously followed a semi-democratic system before transitioning into a democratic state. One of the key factors behind the success of Christianization in South Korea was the social and economic transformation occurring at that time, which made Christianity more easily accepted because it offered individual welfare, certainty through its doctrines and institutions, and a foundation to resist the oppression faced by South Korean society during that period[5].

Through the role of Catholic and Protestant religious leaders who resisted authoritarian states, it ultimately became evident that religion could serve as a symbol of resistance against authoritarian regimes within a country. Huntington emphasized the importance of religion as a form of political identity. In the context of democratic transition, religion has often functioned as a symbol of opposition to authoritarian power.

b) Religion and Its Ambivalence in Politics

The relationship between religion and politics can be ambivalent, as religion is considered to have a positive impact when it supports moral values and justice, but it can also have a negative effect if a particular religion dominates politics, thereby hindering pluralism. As a social scientist revealed, in the 1950s Catholicism was seen as a major obstacle to democracy; however, after the 1970s, Catholicism shifted its role to become a force for democracy due to changes within the Catholic Church. These changes, which began in the 1960s, transformed the Church into a strong social institution that resisted dictatorial regimes, stripped them of any legitimacy that could be claimed through religion, and provided protection, support, resources, and leadership for pro-democracy opposition movements. Prior to the mid-1960s, the Catholic Church was still adapting to authoritarian regimes and legitimizing their political policies, but after the mid-1960s it no longer endorsed such policies and, in fact, almost entirely opposed them[5]. In non-communist countries, the relationship between the Church and authoritarian governments tended to pass through three phases: the phase of legitimacy (acceptance), the phase of ambivalence (with both positive and negative impacts), and the phase of opposition[5]. Cases of resistance and disagreement against authoritarian regimes can be analyzed through events in several countries discussed in the following chapter.

3. Case Study on the Role of Religion in Democratic Transition

a ) Poland: The Catholic Church and Solidarity

Poland, as a country where the majority of the population adheres to Catholicism, witnessed since 1980 the dominance of Solidarity as the main opposition force, while the Polish Church under Cardinal Jozef Glemp played a very cautious role as mediator between the government and the opposition for several years. Churches mobilized their strength to resist authoritarianism, with church buildings providing protection and support for opponents of the regime. Additional power came from church-affiliated radio stations, newspapers, and periodicals that echoed the goals of the opposition. The Church itself, as a popular and global institution like those in Brazil, possessed a vast network of members that could be mobilized. In a sense, the Church functioned as a national political machine, with hundreds or even thousands of priests, nuns, and activists who empowered the people to channel opposition protests. This was further reinforced by skilled political leaders such as Cardinal Arns (Brazil), Sin (Philippines), Romero (El Salvador), and Kim (Korea). Additional support also came from church-established organizations, such as the Vicariate of Solidarity in Chile and the National Citizens’ Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) in the Philippines, which promoted the restoration of fair elections[5].

The ascension of Pope John Paul II enabled the Vatican and the Pope to play a central role in the Church’s struggle against authoritarianism. In his first encyclical in March 1979, John Paul II condemned human rights violations and explicitly[14] declared that the Church would serve as the foundation for the defense of human rights. During critical moments in the democratization process, he appeared in his papal grandeur through visits to various countries, including Poland (June 1979, 1983, and 1987), Brazil (June–July 1980), the Philippines (February 1981), Argentina (June 1982), Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Haiti (March 1983), Korea (May 1984), Chile (April 1987), and Paraguay (May 1988). His visit to Poland transformed a mentality of fear—fear of law enforcement, job loss, lack of promotion, expulsion from school, or denial of passports. As a result, people learned that if they ceased fearing the system, the system itself would be powerless. According to Timothy Garton Ash, this marked the beginning of the end of communism in Eastern Europe: “Here, for the first time, we see the manifestation of large-scale, sustained, yet profoundly peaceful and disciplined social unity, gentle crowds opposing the party-state became its hallmark and a vital catalyst for domestic change (1989) in every country except Romania.”[5]

b ) Philippines: The Catholic Church and the EDSA Revolution

The most extreme political involvement by church leaders occurred in the Philippines, where Cardinal Sin, as the leader of the Catholic Church, invited Aquino and El-Salvador Laurel to join an opposition party. Cardinal Sin sent letters of instruction to 2,000 parishes[15] before the election, urging Catholics to vote for individuals who embodied Gospel values such as humility, truth, honesty, respect for human rights, and life. This was made more explicit by Cardinal Sin in his call to support Aquino in the upcoming election. This movement became known as the resistance against Ferdinand Marcos’s dictatorship at that time. Although Marcos attempted to steal the election and staged a military revolt at Camp Crame by mobilizing citizens under the banner of the military through Church organizations and radio stations, the election victory still went to Aquino, guided by Cardinal Sin’s instructions to the Catholic faithful. This event later became known as the EDSA[16] Revolution. Ultimately, during the 1970s and 1980s, Catholicism emerged as the second most influential force after economic development in driving democratization. The presence of the cross on the dollar currency became symbolic proof of religion’s profound involvement in the third wave of democratic transition[5].

Based on the analysis of case studies on the role of religion in democratic transitions from Huntington’s perspective in the book The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, it can be illustrated in the following table:

Conclusion

Yudian Wahyudi and Samuel P. Huntington present complementary perspectives on the relationship between religion and democracy. Yudian, with a locally grounded approach, emphasizes the role of religion as an element that strengthens democracy. Meanwhile, Huntington’s analysis highlights the global challenges arising from differences in values across civilizations.

Huntington’s thought demonstrates the ambivalence of religion in either supporting or hindering democracy. On one hand, religion can have a positive value when it upholds moral principles and justice. On the other hand, religion can have a negative impact when a particular faith dominates politics, as occurred in the 1950s when Catholicism posed a significant obstacle to democracy. What is needed, therefore, is the careful management of religion’s role in relation to politics, particularly during a country’s transition from dictatorship to a better system. In other words, the success of democratic transition requires a wise management of the relationship between religion and politics, where religion can act as a partner in strengthening democratic institutions without dominating the political sphere. The ideas of these two figures provide valuable contributions to building an inclusive and sustainable democracy.